I believed I used to be carried out with Tremendous Bowl LVIII, however one dialog that retains taking place has pulled me again in. I touched on San Francisco coach Kyle Shanahan’s determination to take the ball first in extra time in my recap column final Monday, however after tales broke that some 49ers gamers did not know the principles and video was launched of the Chiefs celebrating Shanahan’s determination on the sideline, it has was a a lot larger story.
After I wrote concerning the sport — which ended with the Chiefs scoring a landing on the second possession of extra time — I suspected the dialog Monday morning would work on discovering a scapegoat for what had gone unsuitable. Given Shanahan’s points in shedding two prior Tremendous Bowls, he was the almost certainly goal, with many conflating a number of 49ers gamers not realizing the brand new extra time guidelines to Shanahan himself not understanding the choices accessible.
You might argue his scapegoat as an alternative turned defensive coordinator Steve Wilks, who got here inside a fourth-down cease of successful a Tremendous Bowl earlier than being fired final week. I might level towards the 49ers’ pass-blockers, who made a number of psychological errors and certain price Brock Purdy & Co. a number of touchdowns within the course of. Extra realistically, San Francisco misplaced for a number of causes, none of which needs to be the one sole issue accountable.
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Having had every week to digest arguments, it looks as if an excellent time to take an extended look each at Shanahan’s particular determination and what your favourite staff’s coach ought to select if he is fortunate sufficient to make it to extra time within the postseason subsequent season. Is it so simple as following what the Chiefs did? I am not so certain. Let’s run by the arguments I’ve seen in favor of selecting to get the ball first or second and consider whether or not they maintain up:
Leap to an argument:It is the identical as faculty soccer!You are not getting the ball again!However Mahomes is on the opposite aspect!Shanahan tousled on his OT drive!The decision: What ought to groups do in future?
Argument No. 1: It is the identical as CFB!
“We already know what to do from faculty soccer. Go second so you’ll be able to know what you want. Downside solved.”
That is the argument I noticed most frequently about this determination, and it is simply unsuitable. Whereas there is definitely a profit to getting the ball second — let’s name this being Workforce 2 from this level ahead — and realizing what you want, there are two main variations between the NFL’s playoff extra time course of and faculty soccer’s. One is discipline place: The NFL’s rule begins every possession with a normal kickoff, whereas faculty soccer extra time begins on the 25-yard line for 2 possessions earlier than beginning on the 3-yard line for the third extra time.
The opposite distinction is extra important, and it is the issue Shanahan introduced up in making his determination. In faculty soccer, groups all the time get an opportunity to both match or prime the primary staff’s (Workforce 1) rating on their drive, so there’s not a lot thought: Most groups will choose to be Workforce 2 and know what they want in the event that they wish to win. With that being stated, from 2013 to 2021, Workforce 2 received solely 51% of the time in a 243-game pattern of school soccer overtimes, so this is not a major benefit.
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If the 2 NFL groups are tied after they every get one possession with the soccer, although, Workforce 1 will get the ball for the third possession of extra time with the chance to win by scoring a discipline objective or landing — with out giving the ball again to the opposing staff. That is a dramatic benefit! Keep in mind that from 1994 to 2011, when NFL groups had been capable of win in extra time by kicking a discipline objective and with no need to offer the opposition one other possession, groups that received the coin toss received the sport practically 60% of the time. If Workforce 1 will get to the third possession of extra time, it is basically taking part in a sport as if it had received the toss below the league’s previous playoff guidelines.
That 60% quantity additionally underestimates Workforce 1’s probabilities of successful on drive No. 3 of extra time. The NFL was spurred to make the change partially by the bettering efficiency of kickers on long-distance discipline targets, which has solely continued. From 2000 to 2011, kickers hit simply over 55% of their discipline targets within the 50- to 59-yard vary. Over the previous 5 seasons, that mark is as much as 66.6%. The league has moved up the sector place for touchbacks from the 20-yard line to the 25, including 5 free yards for offenses. With defenses drained after a full sport and one other possession of extra time, it additionally needs to be simpler to maneuver the ball. Groups would possibly want solely 35 yards on that third drive to get into discipline objective vary for an excellent kicker.
Make no mistake: Getting the ball third is a gigantic benefit if a staff can get there. The “if” is the exhausting half.
Argument No. 2: You are not getting the ball again!
“There isn’t any likelihood of getting the ball for a 3rd possession, as a result of whichever staff goes second will simply go for 2 or make no matter determination it must make to keep away from letting the opposing staff get the ball again.”
Realizing what you want is the good thing about getting the ball second. For Workforce 1, getting the ball third goes to be a much bigger benefit than realizing what it wants and taking it second, however the trade-off is it’d by no means get to comprehend that chance. Going second means Workforce 2 all the time get the second-mover benefit on that second possession and it could possibly make its choices accordingly. That is the trade-off being made by selecting first or second. Would you slightly have a smaller benefit you are assured to see or a major benefit you would possibly by no means get to take pleasure in?
The reply depends upon how assured you might be about attending to that third drive, which many have appropriately identified will probably be influenced by that second-mover benefit. If Workforce 2 is aware of Workforce 1 could have an enormous benefit on that third possession, Workforce 2 needs to be aggressive in making an attempt to prime Workforce 1 and win on the second possession of the sport. We did not see the Chiefs pressured to any form of significant determination within the Tremendous Bowl, although they wanted to go for it on fourth-and-1 inside their very own territory to increase the sport.
Will Workforce 2 truly be that aggressive in actuality? It is exhausting to say. That is uncharted territory — Tremendous Bowl LVIII was the primary extra time playoff sport performed below this format — and it is hardly as if coaches are as aggressive because the proof suggests they need to be throughout regulation, which is a sport state everybody’s already acquainted with and may perceive. It is simpler to consider why this could be a difficulty if we cut up it out by what occurred on Workforce 1’s opening possession of extra time:
Workforce 1 would not rating on the opening drive. Nice! Now, Workforce 2 has that perfect benefit we talked about on the third possession, nevertheless it has it on the second possession as an alternative; it could possibly win with a discipline objective and would not have to offer the opposing staff an opportunity to match. That is an ideal scenario to be in, and it each makes getting the ball second a extra worthwhile proposition and may encourage Workforce 1 to be extra aggressive than regular on their first possession to keep away from giving Workforce 2 that benefit.
2:27
Stephen A. on Shanahan: It’s important to query if his ‘palms get sweaty’
Stephen A. Smith wonders if 49ers coach Kyle Shanahan has the fortitude to win a Tremendous Bowl after blowing one other lead within the massive sport.
On the similar time, there will probably be loads of situations the place Workforce 2 will get the ball and in addition would not rating, like a sport between two glorious defenses or in horrible climate situations. Possibly each groups take a sack on their opening drives and find yourself in fourth-and-long and might’t even take into account going for it. Workforce 2 may find yourself failing on a fourth-and-short exterior of discipline objective vary, because the Chiefs may have in opposition to the 49ers. They might miss a discipline objective.
They might even have a conservative coach who makes suboptimal choices on fourth downs basically and leans on “trusting his protection” and punts versus making an attempt a protracted discipline objective and working the chance of handing the opposing staff a brief discipline. We have seen coaches make inexplicable choices through the common season; in 2022, Broncos coach Nathaniel Hackett let the clock run down and tried a 64-yard discipline objective down one level in Seattle as a result of he thought Brandon McManus’ probabilities of changing had been higher than that of selecting up a fourth-and-5. Do not assume Workforce 2’s coach will run issues like he is John Harbaugh or Dan Campbell.
Workforce 1 kicks a discipline objective on its opening drive. Here is the situation that performed out Sunday. The 49ers obtained contained in the crimson zone however stalled out when proper guard Spencer Burford whiffed in go safety, giving Chris Jones a free rush at Purdy and forcing a throwaway. (In my recap of the sport written earlier than the All-22 footage was accessible, I blamed proper sort out Colton McKivitz for the go safety gaffe; after attending to see the footage, it was extra doubtless Burford’s mistake. That is my unhealthy.) On fourth-and-4, Shanahan despatched out rookie kicker Jake Moody, who hit a 27-yard discipline objective to offer the 49ers a 22-19 lead. We’ll speak extra about Shanahan’s decision-making later, however what the Chiefs did subsequent.
Trailing by 3 factors, Workforce 2 completely needs to be extra aggressive on its opening possession of extra time. The implied affect of handing the ball again to Workforce 1 in a discipline goal-and-win scenario ought to justify leaning towards going for it in nearly each marginal scenario, since a landing wins the sport and a discipline objective nonetheless leaves Workforce 2 as an enormous underdog. Ideally, coaches will alter accordingly, however I have been protecting decision-making within the NFL for practically 15 years, and there are nonetheless loads of coaches who worth making a safer determination that extends the sport over a riskier one that offers them a greater likelihood of successful.
Let’s take the Tremendous Bowl and alter the info ever so barely for instance. On that remaining possession of extra time, Patrick Mahomes hit Rashee Rice on a third-and-6 from the Kansas Metropolis 46-yard line for a 13-yard completion. It could be tough to think about a world by which Chiefs extensive receivers drop passes, however let’s fake Rice drops that ball. On fourth-and-6 and out of discipline objective vary whereas needing at the very least a discipline objective to increase the sport, the Chiefs would have needed to go for it. No one is arguing that one.
What if that third-and-6 drop got here on the San Francisco 36-yard line? Now, Workforce 2 has fourth-and-6 for its season — whereas additionally needing to then rating a discipline objective or landing afterwards — or the potential for hitting a 54-yard discipline objective and making an attempt to win a sport the place it is not assured to get the ball once more. With Harrison Butker, the Chiefs in all probability would be ok with that discipline objective, however with Mahomes, they’d additionally doubtless be pondering they’ll convert fourth-and-anything. I feel coach Andy Reid would go for it, however there are positively groups that kick the sector objective in that scenario.
Transfer the ball ahead 20 extra yards. Now it is fourth-and-6 from the 16-yard line, which suggests a 34-yard discipline objective. Over the previous 5 seasons, kickers have transformed 34-yard discipline targets slightly below 90% of the time, and eliminating blowout situations, groups have transformed fourth-and-6 simply over 47% of the time. Even acknowledging that going for it and succeeding places Workforce 2 in a a lot better situation than kicking and taking part in protection in opposition to Workforce 1, are coaches actually going to go up one thing near a surefire kick to increase the sport versus a go-for-it alternative that could be one thing beneath a 50-50 shot?
This is only one situation, however you get the thought: Whereas it might sound straightforward to imagine Workforce 2 will go for it when it trails by a discipline objective to keep away from a 3rd possession in extra time, I consider there are many situations the place Workforce 2 will kick and hand the ball to Workforce 1. Even when Workforce 2 will get extra aggressive on fourth right down to keep away from the third possession, it will additionally fail on a few of these fourth-down makes an attempt, which might hand Workforce 1 the victory with no need a 3rd possession.
Workforce 1 scores a landing on its opening drive. In a technique, this alternative is easier. Workforce 2 will probably be going for it on each fourth down, as a result of its selections are a landing or no tomorrow. There isn’t any decision-making wanted through the possession.
If Workforce 2 scores a landing, although, there’s an necessary determination to be made. Ought to it go for two to stop Workforce 1 from getting a 3rd possession with an enormous benefit? Within the overwhelming majority of instances, sure. Over the previous 5 seasons, groups have transformed simply over 50% of their 2-point tries. If Workforce 2 thinks its probabilities of changing a 2-pointer are higher than its probabilities of successful in opposition to Workforce 1 in a third-possession scenario, it is higher off going for two. Whether or not you assume Workforce 2’s probabilities of successful with out the ball beginning with possession three are 40%, 35%, 30% and even decrease, it is clear the 2-pointer is the higher determination.
Once more, although, can we assume NFL coaches will truly act optimally? It is solely just lately that we have seen some groups heat as much as the thought of going for two whereas down 14 or making an attempt the two-point conversion on their first landing whereas down 15. Even when a staff is a major underdog and would profit from shortening the sport to 1 play, we have usually seen groups kick the additional level after a late landing to tie the sport versus making an attempt to win the competition with a 2-pointer.
For instance it turns into clear Workforce 2 will all the time go for two after scoring a landing to stop the third possession from occurring. Does it make sense for Workforce 1’s technique to react?
Ought to Workforce 1 go for two after a landing on the primary drive?
If you wish to speak about a dominating scenario, take into account what would occur after a Workforce 1 landing on the opening drive. If it goes for 2 and converts, Workforce 2 can be pressured to drive the size of the sector, rating a landing after which convert its personal 2-pointer simply to maintain the sport going. If Workforce 1 scores eight factors on the opening drive, it is both going to win earlier than touching the ball once more or get the ball again with that wildly advantageous third possession the place it could possibly win with only a discipline objective.
Is that price it? As my colleague Seth Walder wrote on Twitter, nearly positively not. If the 2-pointer is a 50-50 proposition and Workforce 1 is aware of Workforce 2 goes for two if it scores a landing, Workforce 1 can kick the additional level and know Workforce 2 goes to win 50% of the time if it scores a landing.
If Workforce 1 goes for two, it is going to fail 50% of the time after which lose on a Workforce 2 landing, since Workforce 2 can merely kick an additional level to win. Workforce 1 may additionally lose, although, if it converts the 2-pointer, has it matched by Workforce 2 after which fails to attain on the third possession. That in all probability means Workforce 1 loses about 58% of the time if it goes for two and Workforce 2 manages to additionally rating a landing.
Given how uncommon playoff extra time has turn into, it will take a very long time earlier than any form of playoff meta establishes itself and groups can say with confidence they’re going to know what the opposite staff will do. I feel it is secure to say Workforce 1 must be apprehensive Workforce 2 will go for two if each rating a landing, however you’ll be able to’t say Workforce 2 will in each scenario, given how coaches usually deal with comparable conditions. Until Workforce 1 is actually a dominant staff from 2 yards out, it has to take going for two on the opening rating off the desk.
What do analytics say concerning the determination?
As revealed by the 2 sides of Sunday’s sport, depends upon who you ask. Shanahan stated after the sport the 49ers’ analytics division urged he select to take the primary possession in extra time. The Chiefs had been thrilled to get the ball second, which was apparently Chiefs statistical evaluation coordinator Mike Frazier’s recommendation to Reid to pick out if Kansas Metropolis received the toss. The Chiefs and the 49ers are two of the NFL’s most revered organizations, so how may their respective analytics departments come to totally different conclusions?
That may very well be the case if there wasn’t a lot of a distinction between the 2 choices. When ESPN’s Brian Burke constructed a mannequin to check the brand new extra time guidelines in 2022, he discovered that Workforce 1 received 50.3% of the time if Workforce 2 did not go for two after it scored a landing. That mark fell to 50.2% if Workforce 2 all the time went for two after scoring, denying Workforce 1 a possibility for a 3rd possession.
When Walder took a casual ballot of NFL analytics workers after Tremendous Bowl LVIII, the outcomes had been cut up. 4 individuals had their opinion at nearly 50-50. Three leaned towards taking the ball first. Three others felt assured they most well-liked taking the ball second. With all that in thoughts, it is no shock that we landed on two groups with two totally different opinions about what represented optimum technique with the extra time coin toss.
It is also necessary to regulate these fashions for the sport scenario and groups and gamers concerned. Whereas these changes won’t lead to dramatically totally different modifications to the findings and conversations above, there are allowances groups would possibly wish to make after they’re taking part in in opposition to a quarterback like Mahomes. Many have urged Shanahan obtained that unsuitable.
Argument No. 3: However Mahomes is on the opposite aspect!
“Shanahan screwed up as a result of he gave the ball to Mahomes with the prospect to win the sport with a landing.”
This isn’t so simple as some individuals have made it out to be. In fact, no staff desires to be defending for its playoff life in opposition to Mahomes, however that is a scenario that may be scary whether or not the staff faces him on the primary or second drive. If the 49ers had taken the ball second, they’d have been sending out a gassed protection that had simply confronted an 11-play drive within the two-minute drill. Had the Chiefs scored a landing as Workforce 1, individuals would have been criticizing Shanahan for placing all of the stress on Purdy, his second-year quarterback, to match Mahomes with a landing.
Letting Mahomes go second gave the Chiefs the benefit of being extra aggressive on fourth down, which makes their offense scarier than it will be throughout a typical drive. Each staff’s higher with an additional down, however the Chiefs and their ruthless effectivity can be much more devastating if Reid may open up the playbook on second and third down whereas realizing he would go for it on fourth down. If Mahomes and Reid had wanted a landing, they’d have been extra prone to rating than they’d be on a typical drive, if solely by advantage of getting that additional play of their pocket.
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With that being stated, as Tim Cowlishaw identified on “Across the Horn” on Monday, it is not as if the Chiefs’ offense had been marching up and down the sector all sport. Their solely landing earlier than extra time got here on a brief discipline after a muffed punt. After scoring on the primary two drives within the AFC title sport in opposition to the Ravens, the Chiefs had gone 19 consecutive drives beginning on their very own aspect of the sector with out changing a single one right into a landing. Whereas Mahomes undoubtedly deserves credit score for coming by at a very powerful attainable second, he and the Chiefs had been making an attempt to attain on a type of lengthy drives earlier than extra time, too. Treating a Kansas Metropolis landing on the second possession as a lock is overconfidence.
Whereas it seems like Mahomes all the time comes by in these conditions, there are situations the place he has been lower than computerized. His final drive in playoff extra time was through the 2021 season, when he and the Chiefs went to extra time within the AFC Championship Recreation in opposition to the Bengals. The Chiefs received the toss and will have received the sport with a landing, however Mahomes threw an interception on the third play, and Cincinnati drove into discipline objective vary and kicked its solution to Tremendous Bowl LVI.
The Chiefs in all probability would have gone for 2 if the groups had traded touchdowns, and relying on the way you have a look at it, that would have been an issue for the 49ers. Over the previous 5 seasons, Kansas Metropolis has transformed a league-best 75% of its 2-point tries. I will additionally observe it has tried solely 12 over that stretch, tied for the second fewest of any staff. (Solely the 49ers have tried fewer.) A few of that’s hardly ever trailing and needing 2-pointers, however we have additionally all seen the Chiefs make sloppy errors contained in the 5-yard line, even through the Mahomes period and as just lately as Mecole Hardman’s touchback in opposition to the Payments within the divisional spherical.
Argument No. 4: Shanahan tousled on his extra time drive!
“The 49ers ought to have gone for it on fourth-and-4 as an alternative of kicking a discipline objective.”
Now we’re speaking! After the sport, when requested concerning the determination to kick a discipline objective on fourth-and-4 in extra time, Shanahan instantly shot down the thought. “We by no means considered it there on fourth-and-4,” he informed reporters. “Even when we do go and rating, they nonetheless can go down and match it and so there wasn’t a thought there.” (Shanahan famously stated the identical factor about not going for a fourth-and-2 in opposition to the Rams within the 2021 NFC Championship Recreation, a choice that each got here again to chew him and was a notable error by win chance fashions.)
Effectively, maintain on a second, Kyle! It is true that the Chiefs can go down and match a landing with a landing, however matching a landing is much more tough than matching a discipline objective. As well as, the 49ers had gone for and transformed a fourth-and-3 in the identical vary earlier within the sport on a drive that ultimately produced their second landing. On the very least, this looks as if it was price extra thought than Shanahan urged.
If Shanahan’s objective was to get extra time to a 3rd possession as urged in his justification for taking the Workforce 1 choice, it is nearly actually higher to attain a landing than it’s to kick a discipline objective, because it’s harder to match seven factors than three. The opportunity of the Chiefs scoring a landing and going for 2 is actual — and the 49ers would possibly hope to anchor Kansas Metropolis towards kicking a discipline objective by going up three (in the way in which that groups that kick a discipline objective to go up six late in regulation usually damage their possibilities by incentivizing the opposite staff to go for a game-winning landing versus a game-tying discipline objective) — however I nonetheless assume Shanahan ought to and would have favored his probabilities of successful up seven versus up three.
As for the fourth-down play itself, it is not as if the 49ers had been hopeless in that scenario. That they had managed to get each Jauan Jennings and Brandon Aiyuk open for potential touchdowns on the earlier third-and-4 play, just for the go safety to fail as talked about earlier. Shanahan known as for a novel play-action safety that had heart Jake Brendel come out to dam the sting on the left aspect, with Trent Williams and Aaron Banks working inside. Security Justin Reid blitzed and would have been Purdy’s accountability both means, however on condition that the breakdown on the appropriate aspect led to Jones working free and blowing up the play, it is exhausting to argue the safety was the appropriate name on the proper time.
Shanahan stated he wasn’t excited about going for it on fourth-and-4, and that is the place his mistake got here in. On third down, the 49ers got here out in 11 personnel (one working again, one tight finish and three extensive receivers), and the Chiefs matched with their dime personnel bundle (six defensive backs). There wasn’t even a pretense of working the ball, as Purdy lined up in empty and had Christian McCaffrey transfer throughout the formation in movement.
The league’s most aggressive fourth-down offenses achieve a bonus on third down by being prepared to run in conditions the place groups usually throw the ball. Third-and-4 (and even longer) could be a run down for the Eagles, Lions and Ravens, as a result of they’re comfy both selecting up the primary down or going for it on fourth-and-short. In 2023, on third down with 3-to-5 yards to go in video games the place every staff nonetheless had at the very least a 20% win chance, Shanahan known as 16 passes on 17 performs. The Lions known as 29 passes on 39 performs. The Eagles known as 24 passes on 41 performs. Purdy is not Jalen Hurts, however the 49ers have an ideal speeding assault, and the Chiefs aren’t an ideal run protection, even when they had been higher than anticipated in opposition to San Francisco.
Shanahan has run on third-and-long earlier than, with Raheem Mostert’s third-and-8 entice in opposition to the Packers within the 2019 NFC Championship Recreation as a well-known instance, but when he wasn’t excited about going for it on fourth down, it had an affect on his third-down name. Working the ball on that third-and-4 may have transformed by itself. It additionally may have arrange a fourth-and-short that may have tipped the scales towards going for it and probably changing for a landing. The larger challenge with what occurred on third down was the go safety, but when Shanahan was extra open towards going for it on fourth-and-short, the 49ers can be a extra dynamic offense on third down. With out realizing how issues would play out, the 49ers in all probability would have been higher off working on third-and-4, particularly given how the Chiefs matched with their personnel.
Was Shanahan proper to go first? What ought to groups do going ahead?
Anybody who tells you Shanahan clearly made the unsuitable alternative is just too assured. No, we could not have identified Mahomes would rating a landing when the Chiefs had gone seven quarters with out a lengthy TD drive. No, we do not know whether or not the Chiefs would have truly gone for it each fourth down whereas down three factors or gone for 2 if the groups had matched touchdowns, denying Shanahan the good thing about the third-possession benefit. Handing Mahomes the ball second is not empirically worse than having him contact it first, particularly on condition that the 49ers’ protection had simply come off the sector. There’s by no means an excellent time to face Mahomes in extra time.
Tremendous Bowl LVIII: Chiefs 25, 49ers 22
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That is actually the primary time we have ever seen this extra time format play out. Assuming each fourth down and every decision-making situation will play out the way in which it did on this first extra time and utilizing that to guage Shanahan’s alternative is not a wise solution to method decision-making, any greater than it will be to imagine Mahomes is doomed to fail as a result of he threw that interception in extra time in opposition to the Bengals within the 2021 playoffs. I’ve taken main points with Shanahan’s conservative decision-making previously, and I want he’d dealt with the third-and-4 otherwise, however these are totally different conversations from selecting to be Workforce 1 or Workforce 2 in extra time.
With out being caught up within the mystique, the only means for Shanahan to weigh issues would have been to think about two key components. Would it not be worse for him to ship a drained protection again on the sector after it had simply run round throughout an 11-play two-minute drill, or to offer Mahomes an additional play to work with if the Chiefs wanted a landing to tie the sport? With out realizing how issues truly panned out, I can see an argument for each side. I would lean extra towards being Workforce 2 than I did the evening of the choice, however there’s not a transparent and apparent appropriate reply.
As for what groups ought to do sooner or later, given how shut every relative choice is by way of anticipated win charge, I’d guess the smooth components associated to every particular person sport in all probability play a major position in figuring out what the most effective determination would appear to be.
If I received the coin toss, I might wish to be Workforce 1 and get the ball first in a low-scoring sport. The worst factor that may occur to Workforce 1 is a landing by Workforce 2 on the second possession of extra time, since that landing will both win the sport or enable Workforce 2 to strive a 2-pointer to win the sport. (As I lined earlier, Workforce 1 may go for 2 on its opening landing drive, however that is a negative-EV thought.)
If Workforce 1 feels assured it could possibly both match a discipline objective or maintain Workforce 2 scoreless, take the opening possession and it’ll doubtless reap the advantages of that extremely worthwhile third possession. There’s additionally an honest likelihood the staff finally ends up getting another possession than the opposing staff if extra time extends deep into the second quarter of extra time. We won’t assure that what occurred in regulation will proceed to play out in extra time, but when a staff has an ideal protection or thinks the probabilities of a landing from Workforce 2 on its opening drive of extra time aren’t excessive, going first might be the appropriate transfer.
1:26
Orlovsky: Shanahan gave away management of the sport in OT
Dan Orlovsky discusses Kyle Shanahan and the 49ers’ determination to take the ball first in extra time.
However, I might wish to be Workforce 2 and get the ball second in a high-scoring sport or one the place I felt I had an ideal offense and was assured about scoring a landing on the second drive of extra time. Workforce 2 would get the good thing about realizing what it wants, which could be as little as a discipline objective if it stops Workforce 1 on the opening possession. Workforce 2 can management the sport with a landing on the second possession of extra time, which is able to both finish the sport in its favor or enable it to go for two and win the sport with out ever getting Workforce 1 its third-possession benefit. Workforce 2 would spend the whole drive below the stress of realizing one mistake can finish its season, but when it has an ideal quarterback, attending to play the whole drive with a transparent head about method fourth downs is extraordinarily worthwhile.
There’s one exception right here. In video games when there’s unhealthy climate with important wind having an affect on one aspect of the sector, I might choose the aspect with the wind to my again and let the opposing staff select whether or not it desires the ball first. Most extra time video games will finish within the first quarter, giving the staff with the wind an enormous benefit by way of discipline objective distance and discipline place for what could be the whole thing of the additional interval. That will outweigh the marginal profit of selecting to get the ball first or second.
Given these preferences, each groups’ extra time preferences make sense. The 49ers had been taking part in a low-scoring sport and had stopped the Chiefs from producing lengthy landing drives all sport. The Chiefs had a quarterback they believed was unstoppable. In the long run, what occurred in extra time got here right down to execution, not the coin-flip alternative.