You wouldn’t suppose that Ronald Acuña Jr. might presumably have a greater season in 2024 than he simply did in 2023, as a result of all he did final yr was unanimously win the Nationwide League Most Precious Participant Award whereas placing up historical past’s first 40/70 season – and even when that final half was clearly aided by the brand new guidelines, it’s nonetheless 40/70. What could possibly be higher than that?
It’s not precisely affordable to anticipate extra, however it may not be out of the query, both. Normally, once we see gamers put up what looks like a profession season, it’s A) fueled by what seems to be a wave of excellent luck on the proper time, or B) at such an out-of-character degree that it’s inconceivable to ever repeat, or C) it’s at an age the place it’s extra possible that the participant’s finest days are behind them than forward of them.
However A) isn’t the case; it’s truly the alternative. B) isn’t true both, as a result of whereas Acuña indisputably had a superb yr, it was actually solely the steals that have been wildly out of line together with his previous efficiency, and C) nicely, he solely simply turned 26 in December.
All that implies that it’s not arduous to surprise if 2023 was one in all quite a lot of nice years, not one of the best yr he’ll ever have. It’s at the very least doable there’s extra in there, anyway. How may we get there?
1) He didn’t profit from good luck. He may need underperformed.
What we imply by “good luck and probably over- or under-performing” could be discovered within the case of Cody Bellinger, who had a powerful surface-level season (.307/.356/.525, a 133 OPS+), but one which comes with an entire lot of questions on sturdiness and repeatability given his below-average hard-hit fee, in addition to different components.
No such questions exist for Acuña, who arguably ought to have gotten greater than he confirmed final yr. Acuña posted a .428 Weighted On-Base Common, or wOBA, final yr, second solely to Shohei Ohtani. (It’s like on-base proportion, if OBP counted extra-base hits as greater than singles.) However his anticipated wOBA, primarily based on Statcast estimates of his high quality of contact, was truly .460, which means he was 32 factors brief in actuality. That’s the third-largest destructive hole of any certified hitter. When you desire batting common, it’s the identical thought: He hit .337, however posted an anticipated .357, primarily based on the standard of his contact.
(By comparability, Mookie Betts was estimated to have acquired nearly precisely what he earned, posting a .416 wOBA off a .407 anticipated wOBA, which means there was possible no good or poor fortune. You possibly can say the identical for Acuña’s Atlanta teammate Austin Riley, who had a .363 wOBA and a .365 anticipated wOBA. On the opposite aspect, Bellinger’s .370 precise mark far exceeded his .327 anticipated mark, which is a part of his gradual market this winter.)
This doesn’t at all times and even usually simply imply “dangerous luck,” to be clear. Typically you hit a ball 118 mph to the hole and see {that a} rookie outfielder finds himself in the best place on the proper time.
Typically probably the greatest defensive outfielders of the twenty first century reveals you precisely why he’s earned that label.
And generally, you hit a ball that might have been out of 27 different parks in baseball, besides not the one you’re in that day – and so as to add insult to harm, you hit it so arduous and to one of many higher defensive left fielders within the sport that you find yourself with merely a single.
Whether or not that’s “dangerous luck” or “that’s baseball” is as much as you, as a result of it’s lengthy been well-liked to say that it’ll all even out ultimately, and that’s not at all times true.
What’s true, nevertheless, is that 31 completely different occasions final yr, Acuña hit a barrel – that’s a batted ball with the right mixture of exit velocity and launch angle, the varieties which have a median north of .500 and slugging above 1.500 – into an out. It wasn’t simply essentially the most of 2023; it was essentially the most barreled outs of any season since monitoring started in 2015.
9 occasions final yr, he hit a ball farther than 390 ft that was both an out or a single, additionally essentially the most in baseball. (For context, balls hit 390-plus are extra-base hits greater than 85% of the time.)
Now: Does any of this assure that he’ll get extra leads to 2024? No, in fact not, and it’s not like he by no means benefited from any weakly hit bloops, both. A few of these barrels and 390-plus foot fly balls would have been out if he’d pulled them, relatively than despatched them to lifeless heart – like when he hit a blast in Colorado at a projected 416 ft that also grew to become an out.
However as nice as Acuña’s 1.012 OPS simply was, it’s not that out of character with the .989 OPS he put up from 2020-21. (We’re prepared to look previous the underwhelming 2022, when he was working his approach again to hurry following his critical knee harm.) What it mainly comes right down to is that the underlying metrics inform you there may be extra there, versus Betts or Riley, who had neither good nor poor outcomes, or Bellinger, who may be due for a step again.
2) He can tighten up that protection.
This may come as a shock given what number of spotlight clips there are of Acuña throwing out runners silly sufficient to check his cannon of a throwing arm, however the superior protection metrics didn’t look kindly upon his 2023 season. Statcast’s Fielding Run Worth had him as minus-4 runs, and Baseball Data Options’ Defensive Runs Saved stated minus-2 runs, and the explanations have been the identical. Take a look at the Statcast breakdown of how we obtained to the minus-4:
That’s not simply and even primarily about errors; it’s about performs that ought to have been made that weren’t, like this or this or this or this:
Or this, though he compensated with an excellent throw.
We present you these destructive performs to make some extent: This could possibly be excellent news.
That’s as a result of this isn’t like asking a poor defender similar to Kyle Schwarber to enhance his fielding, as a result of that final result appears unlikely given the abilities that Schwarber does and doesn’t have. This isn’t a couple of lack of pace or talent that simply can’t be overcome, like when you have been to place a catcher within the outfield. Whereas Acuña’s pace is certainly down from earlier than the knee harm – the place it was as soon as elite degree, it was within the sixty fifth percentile final yr – it is nonetheless above common. And among the performs he did not make have been fairly presumably partly about defending the knee in much less pressing conditions.
The defensive shortcomings are usually not a bodily limitation, which implies that they don’t seem to be something that an immensely gifted younger participant could not be capable to restrict.
Contemplate this: If Acuña had managed to submit a merely common vary rating in 2023, his WAR would have gone from 8.3 to roughly 8.9. If he’d gotten to even barely above common, he’d be extra like 9.3 WAR. Above common may be an excessive amount of to ask, however common shouldn’t be. Merely eliminating the balls misplaced within the solar or getting barely higher reads – we are saying this stuff as if they’re straightforward, clearly, which they don’t seem to be – would go a great distance towards an much more beneficial season.
3) He can have a greater success fee on the bases.
One controversial facet of Acuña’s 2023 season was that though he did steal 73 bases – which is simply so many bases! – he ranked solely sixth in FanGraphs’ baserunning worth metric, half as beneficial as Corbin Carroll. That’s as a result of whereas Acuña led the game in steals, he additionally had the second-most occasions being caught as nicely, and one time being caught is extra damaging than one time being profitable is effective. (He was extra good than nice on baserunning performs not involving steal makes an attempt, as nicely.)
What to look at for right here is de facto extra about second base than third, as a result of whereas the stat line will say “Acuña was 14-for-16 stealing third,” the reality is that he was not thrown out stealing third by a catcher even as soon as. (The 2 failed makes an attempt have been each when he was picked off by the pitcher.)
As a substitute, he was picked off first base 5 occasions, which all go into the dozen occasions he was thrown out on makes an attempt to swipe second base – the second-most within the Majors. Whereas it could be tempting to suppose that for a follow-up, Acuña ought to go into 2024 making an attempt to steal much more, the extra beneficial approach could be to steal extra effectively, even when meaning fewer steals general.
Contemplate this: By simply the stolen base part of the baserunning metric, there was basically a three-way tie for first place. Acuña stole extra bases than Carroll or CJ Abrams, however have a look at the success fee:
Nobody, clearly, could be upset if Acuña merely repeated the identical stolen base numbers, however buying and selling in a number of bases taken for fewer outs given up could be extra beneficial – particularly when you think about the standard of the batters who hit behind him within the Atlanta lineup.
As we stated, it’s not honest to anticipate extra from Acuna. But it surely’s not unreasonable, both, primarily based on his age, expertise, and the season we simply noticed him produce. Moreover: We haven’t even thought of the repercussions of him bringing that left-handed swing right into a sport, both. There may simply be extra we’ve not even seen but.